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STUDENT NOTES
Exemption Statutes-Yesterday's Protection
At Today's Costs-An Update Needed
Exemption statutes reflect legislative balancing of two opposing
social forces. On the one hand, the creditor demands assurance that
he will be able to collect from his debtor that to which he is entitled.
Although a moral duty rests upon the debtor to pay, it is recognized
that governmental sanctions are needed as a prod to the reluctant
and as a sobering influence upon the thriftless. On the other hand, the
state is interested in the well-being of its citizens and has an obligation
to see to it that the unfortunate are not left destitue.' As a result,
statutes exempting certain property of the debtor from execution
have been developed by the various states so that the debtor can pro-
vide for the basic needs of him and his family. The purpose of the
West Virginia personal property exemption statute2 as declared by
the West Virginia Supreme Court3 is "for the protection and benefit
of a poor debtor and his helpless family, to give them the bread of
life and a pillow whereon to lay the head, to save them from destruc-
tion and absolute want."
No two states are in complete agreement as to what a debtor
should be able to exempt in order to "protect his helpless family"
(without being relegated to the rolls of public welfare) and at the
same time provide creditors with their fair and rightful share of the
insolvent debtor's assets. However, the statutes exempting personal
property generally can be grouped into three categories: 4 (1) those
which exempt certain enumerated items; (2) those which exempt
specific items, plus whatever the debtor may choose up to a certain
dollar limit; and (3) those which allow the debtor to choose the per-
sonal property he wishes to be exempt.
Under the first category,' those items which are commonly
exempted are wearing apparel, household goods, bibles, a church
'Margolin, Bankruptcy Exemptions: Critique and Suggestions, 68 YALE
L.J. 1459 (1958-59) and Joslin, Debtor's Exemption Laws: Time for Modern-
ization, 34 LIm. L.J. 355 (1959), as to the problem of "certainty" vs. "flex-ibility."2 W. VA. CODE oh. 38, art. 8, § 1 (Michie 1966).
State v. Allen, 48 W. Va. 154, 162-63, 35 S.E. 990, 993 (1900).
4 Note, Debtor Exemptions in Personal Property-Proposals For Modern-
ization, 52 Ky. L.J 456 (1964).5A uz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-1122-25 (1958) and Tnx. Civ. STAT.
ANN. art. 3832 (Vernon 1966) are examples of statutes which list numerous
specific items with no dollar limit attached thereto. A variation of this
1
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pew, livestock, and agricultural tools. The Texas family, for example,
is entitled to exempt numerous livestock animals, all household and
kitchen furniture, all farming equipment, all tools and books of a
trade or profession, all wearing apparel, all food for the use of the
family, cemetery lots, and one carriage.6 Furthermore, the Texas
court held that a carriage and an automobile were essentially the same
thing, and therefore exempted the latter as a "carriage."7 Kentucky
also has this type of statute, but it exempts all household furniture up
to $1,500 in value and allows a farmer an exemption of up to $1,500
for his livestock and equipment.8 Mechanics are allowed to exempt
their tools up to $300," and one in a profession can exempt his office
equipment, library, and furnishings up to $1,000.' Kansas, 1 , Ken-
tucky, 2 and Wisconsin"2 allow the debtor to exempt his automobile
if he is engaged in farming, or if he uses his automobile in his em-
ployment or in traveling to and from his place of employment.
The second group of statutes are those which list a few items
the legislature particularly feels should be exempt, and then allows
the debtor to choose other property within a dollar limit which he
also wishes to exempt from execution. 4 Pennsylvania, for example,
allows a family to exempt all wearing apparel, bibles, and school
books, plus $300 worth of personal property."5 Illinois exempts all
type is one which also enumerates the personal property which is exempt,
but places a dollar limit on some of the items. For examples of this type,
see CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 52-352 (1958); IDAHO COoE ANN. § 11-205(7)
(1948); IowA CODE ANN. § 627.6 (1966); KAN. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 60-2304
(Supp. 1971); KY. REv. STAT. ch. 427.010 (Baldwin 1971); Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 307 (Supp. 1971); Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 272.18 (Supp. 1971).
6 TEx. Cv. STAT. ANN. art. 3832 (Vernon 1966).
7 Hickman v. Hickman, 149 Tex. 439, 234 S.W.2d 410 (1950).
8 Ky. Rlv. STAT. ch. 427.010 (Baldwin 1971).
9 d., ch. 427.030.
10 d., ch. 427.040.
" KAN. GEN. Lw ANN. § 60-2304 (Supp. 1971).
,2 KY. REv. STAT. ch. 427.010 (Baldwin 1971).
13 Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 272.18 (Supp. 1971). Wisconsin places a limit of
$1,000 on the automobile exem~tion. In attempting to make its statute
applicable to the needs of todays debtor, Wisconsin also exempts, among
other things, one television set, one radio, and several items of farm
machinery including a tractor of up to $1,500 in value. In doing so, they
have recognized the dependence of the twentieth century individual on
transportation and mass communication.
14For various examples of this type statute see ILL. STAT. ANN. art.
52 § 13 (Supp. 1971); Mo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 513.435 (Vernon Supp.
1971); N.D. CENTuRY CODE ANN. § 28-22-02 & 03 (Supp. 1971); N.Y.
CONSOLiDATED LAWS CPLR § 5205 (McKinney 1971); Omo REv. CODE
ANN. § 2329.66 (Page Supp. 1971); PA. STAT. ANN. § 2161 (Purdon 1967);
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. ch. 6.16.020 (Supp. 1970).
,5 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 2161 (Purdon 1951).
2
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wearing apparel, family pictures, and school books, plus $300 worth
of other personal property for a single person and $700 worth for a
family."6 Washington has similar specific exemptions for families and
single persons. In addition, a householder is allowed to exempt house-
hold goods up to $1,000, food and fuel for three months, and other
property not to exceed $400.17
The third category of statutes are those which allow the debtor
to choose the personal property he wishes to hold as exempt, up to a
prescribed dollar limit. West Virginia's personal property exemption
statute 8 falls into this category. With respect to the dollar limitations,
a wide range exists among the various statutes of this type, with the
limitation runnning as low as $200 in West Virginia 9 to as high
as $1,600 in Georgia.2"
West Virginia first enacted a personal property exemption law
in 1863." It provided that "[a]ny husband or parent residing in this
State may set apart his personal estate not exceeding two hundred
dollars in value, to be exempt from execution or other process."22
The legislature also provided that a "husband or parent" could set
aside real estate to the value of five hundred dollars as a homestead
exemption.2 When the State Constitution was revised in 1872 it pro-
vided for exemption laws.2 Subsequently, the legislature established a
16 
LL. ANN. STAT. art. 52, §§ 1, 13 (1957). See also Note, Debtor
Exemption in Personal Property-Proposals for Modernization, 52 KY. LJ.
456 (1963-64) for a discussion of various state exemption laws and as a
reference to the various state code citations.1 7
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. ch. 6.16.020 (Supp. 1970).
' 8 W. VA. CODE ch. 38 art. 8, § 1 (Michie 1966).
19 Id.
20 GA. CODE ANN. § 51-101 (1965). See also IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-3501
(Burns 1946) ($600 limitation); MD. CODE ANN. art. 83, § 8 (Supp. 1971)
($500 limitation); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-378 (1969) ($500 limitation); S.C.
CODE vol. 8, § 34-41 (1968) ($500 limitation); TENN. CODE ANN. § 26-201
(Supp. 1970) ($1,500 limitation).
21 Acts of the 2nd W. Va. Leg. ch. 29, § 1, Reg. Sess. (1864).
2 2
1d.
23 Id., ch. 29, § 7.
24 W. Va. Const. art. 6, § 48 (1872).
Any husband or parent, residing in this State, or the infant children
of deceased parents, may hold a homestead of the value of one thousand
dollars, and personal property to the value of two hundred dollars,
exempt from forced sale subject to such regulations as shall be pre-
scribed by law. Provided, that such homestead exemption shall in no
wise affect debts on liabilities existing at the time of the adoption of
this Constitution; and provided further, that no property shall be exempt
from sale for taxes due thereon, or for the payment of purchase money
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homestead exemption of $1,00025 and a personal property exemption
at the 1863 statutory level of $200.26 The only change in West Vir-
ginia's exemption law to date came in 1882 when the legislature added
an amendment 7 to the personal property exemption statute which
allowed an exemption to mechanics and artisans, whether the head
of a household or not, of up to $50 for the tools of their trade.
However, the entire personal property exemption could still not ex-
ceed the $200 statutory limit.
By allowing the debtor to choose the property he wishes to hold
as exempt, within the prescribed dollar limit, West Virginia's personal
property exemption statute has the "flexibility" needed to be work-
able over a period of time.2 As new items replace older goods as
everyday necessities, such a statute will not become outdated as quick-
ly as a statute exempting specific items such as 2 horses, 2 cows, 10
hogs, etc.29 This type statute also gives the creditors the "certainty"3"
they require in making their loans. Since there is a prescribed dollar
limit on the property which a debtor may hold as exempt, a creditor,
when making a loan, knows the amount of a debtor's property which
he can subject to execution. However, this type statute also requires
periodic revision, as the dollar limitations may become unworkable.
This is the case with the present West Virginia exemption statute.
The avowed purpose of the statute is "for the protection and
benefit of a . . .debtor."" Yet the present $200 personal property
limitation is self-defeating. It is, in fact, one of the most niggardly
exemption statutes in the country. In West Virginia today a debtor is
entitled to no more than the legislature of a century ago felt was
needed for a debtor and his family to survive at that time. How can
a statute geared to life in the nineteenth century be applied to the
social and economic realities of 1972 and still achieve its human-
itarian purpose? One must consider conditions as they were when the
acts were passed 100 years ago-no gas, no electricity, no automo-
25 W. VA. CODE ch. 38, art. 9, § 1 (Michie 1966).
26 Id., art. 8, § 1.
27 Acts of the 15th Legislature of W. Va. ch. 19, § 23 Reg. Sess. (1881).
28 See Joslin, supra note 1, at 359. For further discussions on the need
for statutes which protect the debtor over a period of time without harm
to the creditors see Abrahams and Feldman, The Exemption of Wages from
Garnishment: Some Comparisons and Comments, 3 DEPAuL L. Rnv. 153
(1954) and Rombauer, Debtors' Exemption Statutes-Revision Ideas 36
WAsH. L. REv. 484 (1961).29 See, e.g., Miss. CODE ANN. ch. 3, art. 307 (1942).
30 See Joslin, supra note 1, at 359.
31 State v. Allen, 48 W. Va. 154, 162-63, 35 S.E. 990, 993 (1900).
32 W. VA. CODE ch. 38, art. 8, § 1 (Michie 1966).
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biles, no appliances. The average person was a hard-working farmer
who produced most of what he used. Debtors were generally con-
sidered to be lazy and thriftless. Since that time conditions have
changed socially, economically, and culturally. We have attained a
standard of living (and cost of living) unimaginable 100 years ago.
Furthermore, governmental responsibility toward the needy and the
welfare state has evolved. 3 There is much more to buy, at much
higher prices-the dollar has depreciated and the cost of living sky-
rocketed. The Consumer Pride Index, 4 for example, shows that the
1971 dollar in 1872 would have been worth about $3.40. It follows
that to exempt $200 worth of 1872 goods at their present dollar
value would require an exemption equivalent to about $680. This
should be considered in light of the fact that the $200 was designed
to cover personal property such as oil lamps, wash tubs, iron pots,
etc. It was not designed for the necessities of a family in the twen-
tieth century, such as automobiles, appliances, and clothing. The
answer to the question of how it is possible to apply a 100-year-old
socio-economic statute realistically to today's way of life is startlingly
clear. It is not possible-at least not possible and still achieve the
results which were intended by the statute. For when these factors
are considered, it is apparent that the debtor of today is entitled to
less than what the legislature of a century ago felt a debtor at that
time needed to provide for his family. 5
The dollar limitations are not the only points of West Virginia's
exemption statute in need of re-examination. At the present time a
single person does not qualify for protection under the exemption
33 See Margolin, supra note 1, at 1497.
34 U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 1600,
U.S. CITY AvERAGE FOR ALL ITEMS, 1800-1967, AND THE SELECTED GROUPS,
AM PURCHASING POWER OF THE CONSUMER DOLLAR, 1913-67, at 236-37
(1968); U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, CONSUMER
PRICE INDEX, UNITED STATES CITY AVERAGE FOR URBAN WAGE EARNERS AND
CLERICAL WORKERS, at 15 (Dec. 1971).
35 An example which also points out how antiquated West Virginia's
exemption laws are can be seen in two West Virginia Supreme Court decisions.
In Moran v. Clark, 30 W. Va. 358, 4 S.E. 431 (1887), the court ruled that
when the State Constitution was written, the framers intended that the
legislature should enact a homestead exemption of not less than $1,000.
The case of In re White, 185 F. Supp. 609 (N.D. W. Va. 1960), reiterated
this principle in holding that the $200 personal property exemption provided
for in the State Constitution was not meant to be a maximum exemption.
Therefore, any question as to whether the State's exemption laws can be
changed without constitutional revision is solved, as the West Virginia
Constitution placed a duty on the legislature only as to the minimum
standards for the State's exemption laws. No maximum limits were intended.
[Vol. 74
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laws 6 unless he happens to be a mechanic, artisan, or laborer."
Although a single person should not be afforded protection in the
same amount as one with dependents, some protection is needed.
Texas' statute 8 is characteristic of those states which provide exemp-
tions to single persons. A single person in Texas is entitled to exempt
all wearing apparel, all tools and books of his trade or profession,
and cemetery lots.
Another glaring weakness of West Virginia's exemption statute
is its lack of an effective occupational exemption. If a debtor is ever
to become productive again, provisions must be made to allow him
to carry on his work, whatever it might be. At present, the only
occupational exemption allowed in West Virginia is $50 worth of
tools for a mechanic, artisan or laborer. 9 Two particularly objection-
able aspects to this provision are apparent at a glance. First is the
dollar limitation. Like the $200 personal property exemption,4" the
dollar amount is unrealistic today. No longer are a laborer's tools a
few hand tools; many are expensive, electric-powered tools, and the
fifty dollar exemption is barely enough to cover the cost of a car-
penter's hand power saw. Secondly, the provision is too narrow with
regard to the persons covered. There is need of an occupational
exemption, in addition to the general personal property exemption,
which will allow a laborer, farmer, or professional person to exempt
the tools, books, and office furnishings used in his trade, perhaps
with a realistic dollar limitation attached. Furthermore, the exemp-
tion should extend to single individuals as well as to the family man.
The state of Washington," for example, allows such an exemption to
the classes just enumerated of up to $1,500. Kansas42 has a similar
provision exempting tools, books, etc., up to $5,000 in value.
36 Stevens v. Carey, 112 W. Va. 1, 163 S.E. 772 (1932).
3
7 W. VA. CODE ch. 38, art. 8, § 1 (Michie 1966). Any mechanic,
artisan, or laborer, regardless of whether he has dependents, qualifies for the
$50 exemption for the tools of his trade.
38 Tx. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 3835 (Vernon 1966). Many other states
also provide exemptions for individuals without dependents, some placing a
dollar limit on the exempted property. See, e.g., KAN. GEN. LAWS ANN. §
60-2305 (Supp. 1971); Mo. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 513. 430 (Vernon 1949);
N.Y. CONSOL LAws CPLR § 5205 (McKinney Supp. 1971); Omo Rv.
CODE ANN. § 2329.62 (Page Supp. 1971); TENN. CODE ANN. § 26-201
(Supp. 1971).
39 W. VA. CODE ch. 38, art. 8, § 1 (Michie 1966).4 0 W. VA. CODE ch. 38, art. 8, § 1 (Michie 1966).
41 WASH. RaV. CODE ANN. ch. 6.16.020 (Supp. 1970).
42 KAN. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 60-2304 (Supp. 1970). See, e.g., Aniz. REv
STAT. ANN. § 33-1124 (1958); Ky. REv. STAT. ch. 427.010 (Baldwin 1971);
N.Y. CONSOLDATED LAws CPLR § 5205 (McKinney Supp. 1971); Tax. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art. 3832 (Vernon 1966).
6
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Another part of West Virginia's archaic exemption law is its
homestead exemption.43 Like the personal property exemption sta-
tute, it has remained unchanged since 1872."4 There are two basic
reasons why this provision needs revision. Number one again is the
dollar amount. The homestead exemption hardly serves its purpose
of assuring the family of a home "and a pillow whereon to lay the
head,"" for where the value of the property exceeds the $1,000
exemption, it may be sold and the proceeds over that amount dis-
tributed to the creditors.46 The second objectionable feature is that
the exemption is waived by the debtor unless the homestead exemp-
tion is "declared." To declare the exemption, the owner of the pro-
perty must file a deed claiming the exemption. This declaration pro-
cedure is required in only four states.4" The fact that few such exemp-
tions are recorded in West Virginia suggests that the procedures, or
perhaps the exemption itself, is unknown to the average resident,4"
at least until it is too late, since the exemption is good only as to
debts incurred subsequent to recordation of the homestead exemp-
tion.49 The statute should be revised to permit the debtor to claim
the homestead exemption just prior to the property being levied upon
as permitted under the personal property exemption law. The credi-
43 W. VA. CODE ch. 38, art. 9, § 1 (Michie 1966).
44 W. VA. CONsT. art. 6, § 48 (1872).
4
- State v. Allen, 48 W. Va. 154, 162-63, 35 S.E.990, 993 (1900).
46 Moran v. Clark, 30 W. Va. 358, 4 S.E. 431 (1887). Generally the
exemptions permitted by the western states are greater than those of the
eastern states. See 68 YALE L.J. 1459 (1958-59). Texas, for example, allows
a rural family a homestead exemption of 200 acres, with improvements. An
urban family is allowed a lot or lots worth $10,000, without regard to
improvements thereon. Thx. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 3833 (Vernon Supp. 1971).
Kentucky, like West Virginia, has a homestead exemption of only $1,000.
KEN. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 427.060 (Baldwin 1971). See also, ILL. STAT.
ANN. art. 52 § 1 (Supp. 1971) ($5,000 homestead exemption); Miss. CODE
ANN. § 317 (Supp. 1971) ($15,000 exemption); N.Y. CONSOL LAws CPLR
§ 5206 (McKinney Supp. 1971) ($2,000 exemption).
Ohio's statute is commendable in its attempt to save the debtor's home
from forced sale. Where the value of the home exceeds the maximum allowed
as an exemption, i.e., $1,000, and the property cannot reasonably be par-
tioned, the creditor must accept all fair rental value of the property in
excess of $100 annually until the debt is satisfied. Failure to meet the
rental fee then entitles the creditor to a forced sale of the property to satisfy
his claims. Omo REv. CODE ANq. § 2329.78 (page 1954).
4 ME. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 14, §4552 (1964); MAss. LAws ANN.
ch. 188, § 1 (1969); McKnNEY's CONSOL IAws OF N.Y. CPLR § 5206
(1963). See Haskins, Homestead Exemptions, 63 HAIv. L. REv. 1289,
1300-01 (1950).
481d. at 1301 n.102.
49 Linsey v. McGammon, 9 W. Va. 154, (1876); Speidel v. Schossen,
13 W. Va. 686 (1879).
[Vol. 74
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tors would not be harmed by this change; they could plan for the
exemption when making their loans as they now do with respect to
personal property. This type statute would better protect the pro-
perty owner from his own lack of diligence, for few people anticipate
the possibility that someday they may be unable to pay their debts.
In revising the State's exemption laws thought should be given
to the basic needs of the individual and his family. A statute which
would exempt certain enumerated necessities and then permit the
debtor to choose the other personal property he wished to hold as
exempt may be the best overall approach. Items which ought to be
specifically exempt are wearing apparel (excluding furs and ex-
pensive jewelry),'° family pictures and keepsakes, food and fuel for
the family use for a certain period,"' an automobile, and household
goods. The latter two might have a reasonable dollar limitation placed
upon them. The dollar limitation placed upon the amount of property
the debtor could choose to hold exempt is a rather arbitrary figure,
but Illinois has found $300 for a single person and $700 for a family
to be a reasonable amount.52 As previously mentioned, the occupa-
tional exemption must be broadened, and the dollar amount updated.
However, it would perhaps be better if no dollar amount were placed
on this provision; for if a debtor is ever to become productive again,
he must have tools nearly equal to those of his peers. This occupa-
tional exemption and a wearing apparel exemption should also be
available to the single person. With better exemption statutes, the
West Virginia debtor would stand a better chance of remaining off
the welfare rolls and once again becoming a productive citizen.
G. David Brwnfield
5oThe West Virginia Supreme Court in Ohio Valley Bank v. Minter, 108
W. Va. 58, 150 S.E. 360 (1929), held that a diamond ring worth $1,000 and
habitually worn by the person was not exempt from execution as wearing
apparel. The court defined wearing apparel to include "all the articles of
dress generally worn by persons in the locality and conditions of life of the
claimant including whatever is necessary to decent appearances, and protection
to the changes of weather, and also to what is reasonably proper and
customary in that community in the way of ornaments." Id. at 63, 150 S.E.
at 368.
51 See, e.g., IowA CODE ANN. § 627.6 (1966); Wisc. STAT. ANN. §
272.18 (Supp. 1971).
52 ILL. STAT. ANN. art. 52, § 13 (Supp. 1971).
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